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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COM-
MISSION, 
Libelant and Appellant and 
Cross-Respondent, 
vs. 
CLUB FERACO, et al, 
Libelees and Respondents and 
Cross Ap pel/ants. 
BRIEF OF LIBELEES 
UPON 
CROSS-APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 8649 
Libelee is a non-profit Corporation of the State of Utah, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and is a locker club with bona fide mem-
bers and membership for the use of guests and members and 
was such on November 2, 1956 (Findings of Fact, I.) 
In the early morning hours of November 2, 1956, Salt 
Lake City Policeman Ralph Caldwell, claims to have purchased 
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whiskey at the club in violation of Title 32, Chapter 7, Section 
1, 1953 Utah Code Annotated, and he then and there seized 
all personal property at the club premises, without a warrant, 
under the provisions of Title 32, Chapter 8, Section 17, 1953 
Utah Code Annotated. (Findings of Fact VI, VII and VIII.) 
During the morning and afternoon of November 2, 1956, 
Chief of Police W. Cleon Skousen ordered and supervised the 
removal of all personal property from the club premises, such 
property itemized in the Judgment of the Trial Court dated 
January 29, 1957. (Findings of Fact X and XI), and in Libel-
ant's Schedule A. 
In removing said property, the Police used prisoners of 
Salt Lake City for some of the labor. (Findings of Fact XX), 
and some of the property was hauled away in dump trucks 
(Findings of Fact XX). 
In removing said property, the Police and whoever they 
supervised in the moving \\ere wantonly careless, reckless and 
destructive. And in the process of said removal real property 
was also destroyed. (Findings of Fact XY, XVII, XVIII, 
XIX, XXI). 
Trial of the issues was had and d1e Trial Court found that 
policeman Caldwell had purchased whiskey on November 2, 
1956 and t'herefore seizure of some items of personal property 
was legal. These items, designated in d1e January 29th, 1957, 
rudament were sold at oublic auction on l\1arch 2. 1957 for 
.I b " 1. 
$10.00. 
The Court, in the same Judgment, ordered certain property 
returned, \\ hich return was procured by execution issued on 
February 9, 1957. 
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There are bottles of whiskey, specified in said same Judg-
ment, which have been ordered destroyed. All of the whiskey 
seized belonged to club members, but the only claim filed 
for the whiskey was by Club Feraco, claiming it as bailee for 
its members. (Findings of Fact XV and XXIII). 
Libelees take this appeal from the ruling of the Trial 
Court that any part of said seizure was lawful. 
On February 11, 1957, Leonard Feraco and Mary Hooley, 
two of the Libelees in this action, were tried for the criminal 
offense of illegally selling whiskey to policeman Caldwell on 
November 2, 1956, the sale upon which this seizure was based. 
They were both acquitted of that offense in Case No. 33855, 
Salt Lake City Court. 
Upon the basis of that acquittal Libelees made a motion 
to dismiss the Judgment of legal seizure, sale and destruction, 
under the provisions of Rule 60, (b) ( 6), U.R.C.P., but the 
Trial Court denied such motion. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
The evidence does not justify a finding that whiskey was 
illegally sold and if so, the only evidence of illegal use of 
personal property pertains to one bottle of whiskey, four 
glasses and one table. 
POINT II. 
The Trial Court abused its equity discretion m refusing 
to set aside its Judgment of sale and forfeiture of property 
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because of the acquittal of Mary Hooley and Leonard Feraco 
of the very crime upon which the seizure of all property \\·as 
predicated. 
POINT III. 
Title 32, Chapter 8, Section 17, 1953 Ctah Code Anno-
tated is unconstitutional under the provisions of Article I, 
Section 7, Utah State Constitution, as permitting denial of due 
process of law and said Title, Chapter and Section is proscribed 
by the XIVth Amendment of the Constitution of t:he United 
States. 
POINT IV. 
The action of the police officers in the seizure of property 
is void and prohibited by Article I, Section 14, Utah State Con-
stitution, as being brutal and unreasonable. 
POINTV. 
Title 32, Chapter 8, Sections 16, 17, 18, 46 and 48, 1953 
Utah Code Annotated are void as being ambiguous and vesting 
judicial function in policemen, proscribed by Article V, Section 
I, Utah State Constitution, and said provisions are contrary 
to Article I, Section 2-L Utah State Constitution, and contrary 
to the XIVth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
POINT VI. 
The seizure in this action should be voided and declared 
unlawful by recurrence to fundamental principles to protect 
individual rights as prescribed by Article I, Section 27, Utah 
State Constitution. 
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I. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY A FINDING 
THAT WHISKEY WAS ILLEGALLY SOLD AND IF SO, 
THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL USE OF PERSONAL 
" PROPERTY PERTAINS TO ONE BOTTLE OF WHISKEY, 
FOUR GLASSES AND ONE TABLE. 
'· By construing all of the evidence presented in the light ( 
most favorable to Libelant there was no proof of an illegal 
sale of liquor to policeman Caldwell. 
There follows the only testimony concerning the purported 
illegal sale of whiskey on November 2, 1956, as a result of 
which the seizure took place: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION, POLICEMAN CALDWELL: 
Tr. 5, Lines 21, et seq: 
"Q. What happened after that? 
"A. A waitress came over and asked us what we would 
like. 
"A. We all ordered drinks. 
Tr. 6, lines 1, et seq: 
"Q. How many drinks did you order? 
"A. Four. 
"Q. Were four drinks brought to you? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. -did you take a bottle to ~he club with you? 
"A. -No. 
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"Q. -I believe you stated you did take a sip of the 
drink that was given to you? 
"A. Yes. It tasted like whiskey. 
"Q. Do you know whether those drinks had been paid 
for or not? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q.And do you know how much? 
"A. No. 
CROSS EXAMINATION, POLICEMAN CALDWELL: 
Tr. 19, Lines 6, et seq: 
''Q. Who mixed them? 
"A. Leonard Feraco. 
"Q. Did you see what bottle he took these drinks out 
of? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did you order another round? 
"A. No. 
Tr. 34, Lines 6, et seq: 
"Q. Did you buy any drinks? 
"A. No. 
"Q. -Paxton (a member) bought some, didn't he? 
"A. That's right. 
"A. And in your presence there was no police officer 
bought any drinks there, nor neither of your two 
informant, is that right? 
"A. Will you repeat that? 
"Q. Paxton bought them, didn't he? 
"A. Yes." 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
To this point, Libelees urge that it is apparent that police-
man Caldwell did not know what had happened, but in his 
zeal to be a good policeman, he then declared all property 
seized and the next day turned it over to his Chief, who truly 
completd a rape of civil liberty based upon the events above 
testified to. 
That testimony will not sustain the burden, even civil, 
put upon the State to justify such severe and drastic measures 
of seizure and forfeiture. The State's burden of evidence should 
be "clear, cogent and convincing," the ordinary burden placed 
upon one claiming forfeiture. 
To explain this so-called illegal sale, we examme the 
testimony of a member in good standing of the Utah State 
Bar, Mr. Sumner J. Hatch, who testified he told the waitress 
to get Paxton, the member, and his friends, two stool-pigeons 
and policeman Caldwell, a drink out of his bottle (Tr. 13 7 
to 139). 
Libelees urge that this Court would set a dangerous prece-
dent if such severe, arbitrary and destructive police measures 
are held to be justified and are sustained upon evidence that 
is so flimsy that clearly, policeman Caldwell had to guess 
whether or not there was an illegal sale of whiskey, or merely 
a gift of whiskey by a friend, with mixer and ice being paid 
for, which practice, the Court can take judicial notice of, 1s 
common at all of the so-called major clubs in the State. 
If this Court finds the evidence does justify the findings 
of illegal sale, how can it justify seizure of liquor in lockers 
found to belong to members? The lockers had to be broken 
up to get the liquor. 
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Further, Libelees proved the liquor was bailed to Club 
Feraco. 
The above is all supported by testimony found to be true. 
(Findings of Fact XXIII). 
To be fair and avoid specious construction of statutory 
language, if there was illegal sale of whiskey, what instruments 
were used? 
(a) Four ( 4) glasses. 
(b) Two ( 2) bottles of whiskey ( 1 scotch, 1 bourbon). 
(c) The table they were set on. 
(d) The booth, which incidentally is a part of the real 
property. 
The whiskey in the lockers could have been saved, accord-
ing to the tenure of the Trial Court's decision, if each member 
owning t'he whiskey, bearing in mind this was found to be 
a bona fide club for members and guests (Findings of Fact 
I), had: 
( 1) Gone to an Attorney and had him prepare a claim 
and file it with the Clerk of the District Court, and 
( 2) Then become a party defendant in a notorious, what 
appeared to be "bootleg" case, and 
( 3) Sat around waiting to testify in a Yery lengthy pro-
ceeding. 
Further, aU of the liquor behind the bar that was seized 
was identified as being owned by individual members and 
guests. (Tr. 120, 137 to 143, 145 to 147, 148 to 150, 152 to 
155). 
10 
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And despite efforts of the County Attorney to prove there 
was such a thing as a house bottle, that whole precept col-
lapsed. 
To affirmatively prove there was no such thing as a house 
bottle, Libelees proved by the testimony of Charles H. Foote, 
an employee of the Liquor Commission, that no purchases of 
whiskey had ever been made by Leonard Feraco, Ross Feraco 
or Club Feraco (Tr. 113). 
If this decision is permitted to stand, the Great Sovereign 
State of Utah with the help of the glorious Chief of Police of 
Salt Lake City will indeed have rung a gorgeous knell in the 
preservation of public health and welfare. 
BUT WHAT ABOUT SOVEREIGN DIGNITY? 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS EQUITY DIS-
CRETION IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS JUDGMENT 
OF SALE AND FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY BECAUSE 
OF THE ACQUITTAL OF MARY HOOLEY AND LEON-
ARD FERACO OF THE VERY CRIME UPON WHICH 
THE SEIZURE OF ALL PROPERTY WAS PREDICATED. 
The Civil Trial of this matter was commenced on Novem-
ber 23, 1956. 
Final Judgment was rendered on January 29, 1957. 
On February 11, 1957, the criminal charge on the "whis-
key sale" of November 2, 1956, was tried in the Salt Lake 
11 
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City Court, Case No. 33855, prosecuted by the Attorneys for 
Libelant. 
The Jury acquitted the Club Manager and the waitress. 
There it stands, approximately $18,000 worth of property 
hauled away based upon the commission of a criminal offense 
that was not committed. 
Counsel, being aware of the "form difference" between 
a ciminal action and civil action involving forfeiture, however, 
avoided his clients who were seeking an explanation and made 
a motion that the Trial Court set aside its Judgment of forfeit-
ure and sale under the provisions of Rule 60, (b) ( 6), U.R.C.P., 
which reads: 
"Rule 60.-Relief from Judgment or Order." 
"b ( 6) ... or it is no longer equitable that the Judg-
ment should have prospective application;" 
That motion was argued on March 4, 1957, and denied. 
That this case is one in equity cannot be denied, as a 
part of 32-8-47, 1953 Utah Code Annotated provides: "Such 
action shall be brought and tried as an action in equity . . . " 
Libelees claim that all dictates of equity-the breath, 
the spirit of decency, justice and expected fairness of inter-
course between men and sovereign and citizen demand that 
the Judgment against Libelees in this matter should have been 
set aside. 
The Libelees, Leonard Feraco and l\1ary Hooley, sold 
whiskey to policeman Caldwell on November 2, 1956, in vio-
lation of 32-7-1, 1953 Utah Code Annotated. (Libel of In-
formation). They were acquitted on February 11, 1957. 
12 
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32-8-17, providing for search and seizure without warrant, 
the statute upon which this seizure was based, specified seizure 
may be made upon "violation of any provision of this Act." 
Clearly, the seizure is predicated upon the commtsswn 
of a crime and would be void without a crime. 
The charged defendants were, in fact, found not to have 
committed that crime. Yet they stand here guilty. 
Counsel does not profess to have attained great scholastic 
recognition. Yet, he has not had difficulty in discussing difficult 
precepts of law with lay friends and clients nor with well 
versed members of the Bar. Nor has he experienced difficulty 
in the persuasion that law is merely a code of ethics, largely 
dictated by morality, decency and fair play. 
This Court and opposing counsel can tell me and I will 
agree with the esotercism of dogmatic academics and slavish 
adherance to form that there is a difference between civil 
forfeiture and criminal prosecutions. There is a difference in 
the ends sought and the evils to be guarded against and the 
burden of proof and etc., etc., and etc. 
Talk to me about substance. 
Here we have heavy forfeiture and penalty and deprivation 
of property for an offense against a sovereign that that very 
same sovereign could not prove took place. 
Convince me academically-then try to convmce good 
people not formally schooled in the law but having ordinary 
conscience and morality. 
Let such things happen to enough good people and this 
13 
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government would be overthrown-if they were not first 
crushed by sainted police with mailed fist, blackjack and 
bullets. 
Counsel submits that we should perhaps keep our neat 
and fine distinctions; language preciseness is a useful tool for 
conveyance of meanings of good and suppression of evil. 
Let's keep our legal distinctions nice and neat and intact. 
There is a difference between crime and civil forfeiture. 
But, don't abandon and defile the principles of Equity. 
It is not equitable that the judgment of seizure, forfeiture 
and sale have prospective application, even conceding consti-
tutionality, condoning brutaility and finding Libelees guilty 
on every civil charge. 
POINT III. 
TITLE 32, CHAPTER 8, SECTION 17, 1953 UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER 
THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, UTAH 
STATE CONSTITUTION, AS PERMITTING DENIAL OF 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND SAID TITLE, CHAPTER 
AND SECTION IS PROSCRIBED BY THE XIV AMEND-
MENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 
Article I, Section 7, Utah State Constitution: 
"NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIB-
ERTY OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW." 
14 
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Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States: 
" ... NOR SHALL ANY STATE DEPRIVE ANY 
PERSON OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW." 
The right to conduct a lawful business in a lawful manner 
is, of course, one of the fundamental principles to be protected 
under both Constitutions. 
The Statute offending these guarantees is as follows: 
"32-8-17. SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT. When a 
violation of any provisions of this Act shall occur in the pres-
ence of any . . . police officer . . . it shall be the duty of such 
officer without warrant to arrest the offender ... and if such 
arresting officer has reason to believe that one of the businesses 
conducted in the premises . . . was in violation . . . of this 
Act he shall seize all tangible personal property in said prem-
ises ... 
The above section is the one involved in this action. There 
was arrest and seizure of all of the property without a warrant. 
Club Feraco, to uselessly delineate the obvious, was effectively 
and instantaneously put out of business by policemen Caldwell 
and Skousen. Examination of a list of the property seized, 
Libelants' Exhibit A, should demonstrate the degree of the 
closing of the business. 
It was total. 
Libelees ask where is the due process guaranteed by Fed-
eral and State Constitutions ? 
This is exactly tantamount to saying that the victim may 
be killed and then a trial shall be held posthumously. 
15 
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All business, lega] or illegal, is thus permitted to be vio-
lently stopped as a matter of discretion, and upon the judgment 
of a policeman. 
The evil of such a Statute should be adequately demon-
strated in this case, assuming full validity to the Trial Court's 
judgment. 
Part of the business was decreed to be legal, yet its opera-
tion was forcefully and summarily suspended by policemen 
and convicted criminals. 
The inherent evil of such provision is further demonstrated 
by the fact that this Statute gives the power to policemen to 
do what this Honorable Court has adjudged that a State District 
Court cannot do, to-wit: prevent the operation and conduct 
of a lawful business. 
"32-8-47. ABATEMENT. An action to enjoin any nuisance 
defined in this Act may be brought . . . and the Court . . . 
shall forthwith . . . restrain the defendant from conducting 
or permitting the continuance of such nuisance until the con-
clusion of the trial ... " 
Libelant, in this action, sought to have Club Feraco de-
clared a nuisance under the provisions of the above Code Section 
and under 32-8-46. (See Paragraph 4 of the Libel of Informa-
tion.) 
This Court, in the case of Riggins -vs. District Court, 89 
Utah 183; 51 P.2nd, 645, held that the Court could not restrain 
or enjoin any lawful use of premises prior to the conclusion 
of the trial. 
16 
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The same result was held by this Court in Utah Liquor 
Control Commission vs. McGillis, 89 Utah 183; 65 P.2nd 
1136. 
If the Trial Court's decision is permitted to stand, there 
must of necessity, therefore, be announced as a rule of law 
that in the State of Utah a Court of competent jurisdiction 
may not prevent the operation of a lawful business, but if 
it is suspended before trial it must be closed by a policeman. 
That is a dangerous rule. 
It is a precedent that could foster viciousness and if it 
didn't creat viciousness it would certainly protect it. 
How many further steps would need be condoned, on 
such principle, before we were in the sewer of a police State? 
Not many. 
Due process would result if after hearing, probable cause 
was established and unlawful conduct were enjoined until 
trial of all of the issues. 
No process results when a policeman says I think the 
whole business is illegal so I'll close it. If he is wrong, so 
what? You have a civil action against a policeman w'ho may 
earn $4,000.00 per year. But in any event, the subsequent civil 
action given wouldn't substitute for due process at the inception. 
You don't kill the accused and give him a posthumous 
hearing and call it due process. 
Counsel will agree that such a Statute might be reasonable 
if it could be shown that such great harm would result to the 
public that there was immediate necessity ror summary action 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and that any resulting harm done to the business closed would 
pale when compared to the damage that would result by 
merely determining what was lawful or unlawful and then 
stopping the unlawful part. 
In our case no such emergency can be shown, but on the 
contrary to further point up brutality, why wasn't a warrant 
obtained ? Skousen and his men had reason to believe that an 
illegal business was being conducted at Club Feraco for 19 
months before they summarily and without warrant closed it. 
(See Findings of Fact No. V.) 
It is this Court's duty to 'hand down a decision that 
strengthens that fundamental precept that everybody shall 
have his day in Court before he is condemned and punished. 
Due process does not contemplate immediate condemna-
tion and punishment with belated opportunity to show that 
a policeman was wrong in boarding up a business that a Court 
could not touch. 
In our case and under the Statute complained of the 
police are the investigators, the Judge and the Jury all in one 
fell swoop and counsel is satisfied that this pleases Mr. Skousen 
as it did Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar and Benito Mussolini. 
To this point, however, Mr. Skousen has not got the 
backing of Stare Decisis. 
Counsel feels he should not impose upon this Court by 
lengthy citation of cases defining what is or isn't "due process," 
as he realizes that such determination hinges upon facts, the 
law itself being clear. These facts abundantly show that the 
subject Statute effectively denies any determination of rights 
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before having the full fury of punishment visited-by a police-
man. 
POINT IV. 
THE ACTION OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE 
SEIZURE OF PROPERTY IS VOID AND PROHIBITED 
BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 14, UTAH STATE CONSTITU-
TION, AS BEING BRUTAL AND UNREASONABLE. 
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution: 
"UNREASONABLE SEARCHES FORBIDDEN-ISSU-
ANCE OF WARRANT. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated . . . '' 
The place from which this seizure was made was a private, 
bona fide place for use of members and guests of members, 
(Findings of Facts No. 1), and it is submitted that the follow-
ing Conclusion of Law entered by the Trial Court in support 
of its Judgment should not be announced to be the law of 
the land: 
"CONCLUSION OF LAW #III." 
"Seizure of said items referred to in Paragraph I, above, 
was valid and lawful, and abuse of authority and excess of 
force used in removing all of said items from said premises 
and the WANTON and RECKLESS DESTRUCTION of 
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items of personal property and the WANTON and RECKLESS 
DESTRUCTION of wiring and a portion of the building it-
self (real property) does not vitiate or abrogate legality of 
seizure, without warrant, of property from a private building." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Counsel acknowledges that Utah is among the majority 
of States that adheres to the principle that illegally obtained 
evidence is admissible in evidence, and he wishes to point out 
to this Court that no objection was made or is now being made 
to any evidence illegally obtained. 
The sole point being Libelees' contention that: 
( 1 ) The seizure was unreasonable, as being done in an 
unreasonable manner, and 
( 2) Therefore Judgment of propriety in seizure should 
be reversed. 
To this point, then, the first thing to be determined is: 
WAS THIS SEIZURE UNREASONABLE? 
Definition of unreasonable, Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd 
Edition 1785: "Beyond the rules of reason or moderation; 
immoderate or exhorbitant." 
( 1) The Club, through its Attorney, asked Chief of 
Police Skousen to leave all of the property on the premises of 
Club Feraco and Skousen could retain the key until trial of 
the case. Counsel promised Skousen no effort would be made 
to resume business until after trial. Skousen refused and re-
moval was made. (Findings of Fact XI). 
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( 2) Some of the property was moved out in gravel 
trucks. (Exhibit 31-D.) 
( 3) Locked liquor lockers were reduced to kindling wood, 
or less. (Page 3, Memorandum Ruling and Decision.) 
( 4) Tables and seats covered with leather, fastened to 
the walls or floors were torn out and cracked, splitting wood 
and tearing upholstery in many places. (Page 3, Memorandum 
Ruling and Decision.) 
( 5) Real property was wantonly and recklessly de-
stroyed. (Memorandum Ruling and Findings of Fact.) 
( 6) Prisoner labor was used. 
"THE SCENE LEFT THERE BY THE OFFICERS WAS 
MORE SUGGESTIVE OF A VISIT BY THE 'REDS' THAN 
BY THE 'RED, WHITE AND BLUE.' " 
Counsel respectfully suggests that it is just that type of 
mentality and approach to human dignity here reflected that 
was responsible for the slaughter of 7,000,000 Jews in Europe 
during the reign of Adolf Hitler. 
There may be objection to such language, but counsel 
suggests there was a time when the meanest peasant could 
rest in his decrepit tenement, with a shaky roof and be subject 
to the rain and hail and wind but the King and all his forces 
dared not cross his threshold. 
Give such mentality Stare Decisis and then watch -
pounding boots, uniforms, obesience or else, and citizens 
dragged into the night by the hair of their head. 
It's such a comfort to know such things can't happen here. 
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But be fair about it-it has happened, and if this Court says 
that those hurt can't complain because they can sue the police-
men then that makes a hollow mockery of the XIV th Amend-
ment and the Constitution of Utah. 
I am sure that the survivors of any one of those 7,000,000 
Jews wantonly slain probably had a cause of action for wrong-
ful death. 
The case of District of Columbia vs. Little, 178 F 2nd 13, 
stands squarely for the proposition that a health officer 
may not search a house without a warrant, despite statute, 
unless there is an emergency which would justify immediate 
action. 
This Court can sustain the position of Libelees in setting 
this proceeding aside by authority of the above case, it being 
clear there was ample time to obtain warrant and proceed 
under judicial supervision. 
However, the facts at Bar give this Court opportunity to 
re-affirm that in America, policemen are servants and pro-
tectors, not masters and sovereigns and administrators of life 
and dea~h by largesse or caprice. 
This language appears in the case of State vs. Aime, 62 
Utah 476; 220 Pac. 704; at page 706, the Court quoting with 
approval from People t'J. Alayen. 188 Cal. 237; 205 Pac. 435: 
"There might be some reason, or grounds of public policy 
for the State to refuse to the use of evidence thus wrongfull) 
seized, on the grounds that its admission encourages and con 
clones the lawless acts of over-zealous officers ... " 
It is most strongly urged that this Court has a positiv( 
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duty to all of its citizens, living and yet unborn to unequivo-
cally rule that wantonness and destructiveness by policemen 
will not be tolerated. It is against our public policy. 
A judicial precedent that police brutality and maliciousness, 
exceeding the seriousness of the claimed law violation, abro-
gates legality is sorely required in American jurisprudence. 
A. fortiori in this case, because of acquital of the very offense 
upon which all of this wanton and reckless action is based. 
Counsel concedes that Utah public policy is strongly op-
posed to spirituous beverage, but decency demands that what 
might be considered indigenous intolerance should not pre-
ponderate to condone sanctimony and brute destruction. 
Humanity and reason demand that this Court by strong, 
positive and unequivocal language write a decision that will 
be a red flag to all present and future would-be martinets and 
self agrandizing fools. 
To do otherwise would prostitute the concepts of our 
Bill of Rights. 
POINTV. 
TITLE 32, CHAPTER 8, SECTIONS 16, 17, 18, 46 AND 
48, 1953 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED ARE VOID AS BE-
ING AMBIGUOUS AND VESTING JUDICIAL FUNC-
TION IN POLICEMEN, PROSCRIBED BY ARTICLE V, 
SECTION I, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, AND THAT 
SAID PROVISIONS ARE CONTRARY TO ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 24, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, AND CON-
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TRARY TO THE XIVth AMENDMENT OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
These punitive liquor statutes give to a policeman, who 
could be an ignorant and suspicious bigot rather more noted 
for physical courage and strength than a sensitive regard for 
rights and feelings of people, wide discretion and unchan-
nelled judgment as to procedure in case of liquor law violations. 
Such men were called the "Brown Shirts" in Hitler's 
Germany. 
These statutes should be stricken because their ambiguity 
and unchanneled mandates, of necessity, require the exercise 
of judicial function by a policeman. 
To sustain this position one need only examine the statutes 
to see what unrestrained latitude is given: 
If there is a real or supposed violation of the liquor law, 
any Inspector, Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff, Mayor, City Judge, Jus-
tice of the Peace, Constable, Marshall, Peace Officer, District, 
City or Town Attorney, or a Clerk of a Court ( 32-8-25) and all 
other officers and employees of the State and employees of 
any subdivision or agency of the State ( 32-8-26) are speci-
fically authorized and duty bound to: 
(a) Appear before a magistrate and by written oath give 
information and the Judge may then issue a warrant and 
direct seizure (32-8-16) or he may, 
(b) Seize all tangible personal property of a building 
where a violation occurs in his presence, IF HE BELIEVES one 
of the businesses is illegal, (32-8-17), or he may, 
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(c) Seize any liquor which IN HIS OPINION is had or 
kept in violation of law, without a warrant, ( 32-8-18), or 
he may 
(d) Apply to a Court for a temporary injunction against 
illegal use of premises and procure trial to abate it as a nui-
sance ( 32-8-46 and 32-8-47). 
There it is-any one of maybe 10,000 persons in this 
State can, under the statutes and with impunity, seize a bottle 
of whiskey, destroy real and personal property, as in the case 
at bar, or procure the levelling of a $1,000.00 fine and cancel-
lation of lease. 
The choice can be exercised any way that person chooses 
to do it. Counsel defies opposing Counsel to show this Court 
any attempted guide in the selection of what to do. 
It should be clear that these statutes create not only a 
possibility of unequal enforcement of laws, prevented by 
Article I, Section 24, Utah Constitution and the XIVth 
Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, but in fact unequal 
enforcement has resulted: 
(a) :McGillis, 65 P. 2nd. 1136, was permitted to operate 
~· legal business pending trial of charges of illegal conduct, 
and so was Riggins, 51 P. 2d 645, and Kallas, 94 P. 2nd. 414. 
But Club Feraco, though its manager and waitress were ad-
judged not guilty of the illegal conduct charged, had their 
doors closed and their property destroyed. 
(b) Mandeles, 108 P. 2nd. 512, only had a bottle of 
whiskey seized. But Club Feraco was reduced to a shambles 
by policemen and prisoners. 
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(c) Recent seizures at two local bottle clubs, de hors thi 
record, were confined to a few bottles of whiskey. 
So it would seem severity of action can be determinec 
by largesse, whim, caprice, favor, partiality, hatred or jus·, 
plain enjoyment of the exercise of great power. 
There are no standards and no restraints according tc 
present state of Utah law, except: "Sue me, but don't tell 
me I can't be just as brutal or just as gentle as it may please 
me to be, as I can seize all of your property or a little of your 
property or none of your property." 
And the terrifying thing is that such may be done by any 
employee of this State, as 32-8-25 very clearly states that 
they "are vested with the powers of peace officers and powers 
necessary to enforce the provisions of this Act." 
It is, again, either terrifying or interesting to note that 
this Court in the case of Allen vs. Trueman, Judge of Second 
Judicial District, 100 Utah 36; 100 P. 2nd 355, ruled that a 
statute authorizing the issuance of a search warrant on an 
affidavit of information and belief was void under Article I, 
Section 2 5 or our Constitution and yet, if this Court does not 
agree with Libelees in this case it will give a ruling that a 
seizure and search without a warrant is not void even though 
the policeman need only have REASON TO BELIEVE that 
one of the businesses being conducted is illegal. 
Such a ruling would be exactly the same as a rule of case 
law, in the Reporter System Headnotes saying: 
"A policeman cannot justify a magistrate in issuing 
a warrant for seizure of personal property upon his 
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information and belief alone, and in such cases his 
only recourse is to seize the personal property without 
a warrant." 
Counsel urges that these statutes are void as ambiguous, 
and being a total and carte blanche delegation of judicial power 
to 10,000, or more, State employees who may administer them 
and have administered them in unequal degree for identical 
offenses, and upon claimed offenses that may turn out to be 
no offenses, as in the case at bar. 
POINT VI. 
THE SEIZURE IN THIS ACTION SHOULD BE 
VOIDED AND DECLARED UNLAWFUL BY RECUR-
RENCE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES TO PROTECT 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AS PRESCRIBED BY ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 27, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, Section 27: "Frequent recurrence to fundamental 
principles is essential to the security of individual rights and 
the perpetuity of free government.'' 
This section should be applied with posttlve and equal 
vigor to local despots as well as to usurping foreign potentates 
with totalitarian ideology. 
CONCLUSION 
Public policy demands a rule of law that states police 
brutality and excess of authority abrogates legality of such 
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action for every purpose when the abuse is so great as to be 
more dangerous to individual rights and liberty than is the evil 
against which such brutality was levelled. 
Also, must Utah be saddled with such a prolix and all-
encompassing and brutal and ambiguous and unworkable liquor 
law, leaving so much to police decision and judgment as to 
manner, means, method and punishment? 
Chief Justice McDonough's language m State vs. Alta 
Club, 232 P. 2nd, 759, suggests that this Act is "fraught with 
difficult problems of application," to which we say amen. 
In view of what has now happened under this Act, 
this Court should correct the police notion that there may 
be unrestrained force, brutality and destruction as long as 
it pertains to spirits of alcohol, and this even if the accused 
be acquitted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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